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EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES
ON HATCH-WAXMAN LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Many, if not all, patent lawyers have pre-conceptions on how
patent litigation works. For example, many patent lawyers believe
certain district courts are more patentee-friendly than others or that
a jury trial would provide a more favorable outcome than a bench
trial. Many patent lawyers hold a variety of beliefs about the
Federal Circuit and its effect on patent law. A commonly held
belief amongst patent litigators is that the outcome of their Federal
Circuit case depends on the panel of judges that hear their
arguments.1  This knowledge is highly anecdotal - personal
experiences and stories from other lawyers convince many patent
attorneys that the draw of the Federal Circuit panel is outcome
determinative. However, the effect of this belief results in attorney
time and client money spent on preparing for the panel draw. For
example, oral arguments are often tailored to particular judges.2
In addition to "war stories," social scientists have developed an
"attitudinal model" of judicial behavior through empirical studies
These studies attempt to establish links between various judicial
characteristics and outcomes. Voting behavior and ideology by
reference to nominating President or some other indicator has been
the focus of most of these studies.' In addition to ideology, studies
1. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1177, 1191
(1999). Judge Michel's reply to this criticism was: "I believe that these
complaints are exaggerated. By informal monitoring, I estimate that in ninety
percent of these cases the result would be the same with any combination of
three judges from among the court's present complement of ten judges in full-
time service." Id.
2. The Federal Circuit appears to be aware of this practice because the court
does not release the panel composition until the morning of the oral argument.
See Mary L. Jennings, Should Advocates Be Informed of the Identities of
Members of Judicial Panels Prior to Hearings?, 6 FED. CIR. B. J. 41 (1996).
3. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET
AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND
1
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have analyzed correlations between voting behavior and other
judicial characteristics, including geography,5 age,6  gender,7
religion,8 tenure,9 and past experience.1" Most, but not all, of these
studies claim to find positive correlations between judicial
POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51-83 (1983); Sheldon Goldman,
Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AMER. POL. SCI.
REV. 374, 376-83 (1966); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE
48, 51-54 (1986); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges'
Decisions, 55 AMER. POL. SCi. REV. 843, 845 (1961); Richard J. Pierce, Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300,
303-07; Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770-71 (1997); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit
Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42-
43 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Donald R. Songer & Sue
Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States
Courts ofAppeals, 1955-1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 322-23 (1990); C. Neal Tate,
Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362-63 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Songer & Davis, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Effect of Past Judicial Behavior on
Subsequent Decision-Making, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 208, 212 (1979) (finding age a
relatively important factor for Civil Liberties voting).
7. See, e.g., G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the
Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985)
(arguing that female judges tend to be less supportive of personal rights claims
and minority policy positions than male judges, and tend to demonstrate greater
deference to positions taken by the government); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005). But see Herbert M. Kritzer &
Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant
in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 SOC. SCI. J. 77, 86 (1977) (asserting that
female judges behave no differently than their male colleagues in sentencing
criminal defendants).
8. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 6, at 211; Joel B. Grossman, Social
Backgrounds and Judicial Decisionmaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
9. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,
1190 (1991); Goldman, supra note 6, at 211.
10. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 9, at 1189-91 (finding a correlation
between voting in racial equal protection cases and prior prosecutorial
experience); Goldman, supra note 6, at 211.
316
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characteristics and voting patterns.
Some scholars have studied voting patterns of the individual
judges of the Federal Circuit and the effects of panel composition
in decisions involving different areas of patent law." These
studies have not resulted in a clear trend of panel dependency.
However, both studies have shown that the presence of certain
judges on a panel or writing an opinion can increase the likelihood
of a particular outcome. 2 While the methodology employed in
these two and the other empirical studies has been the source of
some debate, 3 their cumulative effect solidifies the notion that
judicial characteristics matter to legal outcomes. Even if not
accurate, the attitudinal model of judging has become prevalent,
and prevalence is enough to support the claim that litigants might
view the identity of the judge as a relevant factor in the prediction
of a case's outcome. 14
While some commentators believe it is not necessarily
11. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges
Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 755-58 (2000)
(finding it difficult to characterize judges as either pro- or anti-patent in validity
final decisions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105 (2004) (finding panel dependency in pre-Phillips claim construction
cases).
12. Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 755-57; Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 11, at 1163-70.
13. See H.W. Perry, Taking Political Science Seriously, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J.
889, 891 (2003) ("Most political scientists ... would not believe that attitudes
are the sole determinant, or that they play as singular a role as propounded by
the so-called 'attitudinal model."'). Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002), with Frank Cross, Michael
Heise & Gregory Sisk, Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002), and Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical
Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002).
14. See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and
Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 581 (1993) ("Not surprisingly, according to
the realist, the ideal lawyer is the one who is in the best position to counsel his
clients about what to expect from litigation. That lawyer will need to know what
leads judges to decide as they do, not what legal reasons, if any, would justify
their decisions .... The best explanation of judicial decisions may include the
set of binding legal reasons, but cannot be limited to them. Instead,
explanations will point to psychological and sociological facts about judges as
part, if not all, of the causal story.").
2009] 317
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troubling, 5 panel dependency can be problematic. If the outcome
of a case depends on the judges on the panel, uniformity of
decisions may suffer even where the underlying facts are similar.
Furthermore, different panels can create or employ competing
doctrines to resolve cases, which decrease the predictability of
outcomes and limits businesses' and individuals' ability to prepare
and plan future courses of action. Also, problems are especially
likely to develop where the dependency is due to judges'
preconceptions about a certain class of litigants and the underlying
legal framework has multiple competing doctrines that allow
flexibility in order to find for their favored party. Due to the
Federal Circuit's nearly absolute appellate jurisdiction of patent
issues and the presence of multiple conflicting doctrines, 6 further
studies into panel dependency and judicial voting patterns are of
interest.
This study will focus on how the Federal Circuit judges vote and
write in cases involving Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
regulated pharmaceuticals, with an emphasis on Abbreviated New
Drug Application ("ANDA") cases. The recent changes to the
process for obtaining FDA approval for marketing drugs were
intended to balance two important public policy goals. 7 First,
drug manufacturers need meaningful market-protecting incentives
to encourage the development of valuable new drugs. Second,
once the statutory patent protection and marketing exclusivity for
these new drugs has expired, the public benefits from the rapid
15. See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 1169 (arguing that
dependency implies some predictability in Federal Circuit behavior - a positive
development and in accord with Congress' mandate for the Federal Circuit);
Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication,
2007 BYU L. REv. 55 (2007) (arguing that panel dependency coupled with early
announcement of panels can lead to settlements).
16. For example, the distinction between "interpreting the claims in light of
the specification" and "reading limitations from the specification into the
claims" constantly causes consternation among the members of the Federal
Circuit as well as the rest of the patent bar. Other doctrines that allow for
malleable decisions include de novo review of claim construction, inherent
anticipation, and the doctrine of equivalents.
17. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 180-Day Generic Drug
Product Exclusivity,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/generic-exclusivity.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2008).
318 [Vol. XIX:2
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availability of lower priced generic versions of the drug. Because
these goals are on-going and statutory language is hardly ever
drafted perfectly , loopholes and unexpected consequences have
arisen that have required solutions. Legislation, with its associated
lag time, may be the imperfect vehicle for achieving a good
balance. However, the courts can be an ideal place for filling the
holes and undefined areas of the statute, as long as judges do not
overstep their judicial role. As such, the Federal Circuit, as sole
appellate court for patent issues, will play a large role in
maintaining the balance of these competing interests.
This study provides insight into whether the Federal Circuit is
properly balancing the competing interests that Congress
recognized in enacting the Hatch-Waxman and Medicare
Modernization Amendments to the FDA-drug approval process,
while providing a jurisprudence that is clear, coherent, and
predictable as dictated by Congress' mandate in the Federal Courts
Improvement Act. In Section II, the theoretical and doctrinal
background of the Federal Circuit and the amendments to the
FDA-approval process, as well as the Congressional intentions
behind all of the relevant Acts, are discussed.
The design of the study is set forth in detail in Section III, which
describes the research methods used, including the development of
the case-coding instrument, the selection of the case population,
the coding techniques, and the limitations. In Section IV, the
results are presented, consisting of three basic inquiries: 1) is the
Federal Circuit as a whole responding to Congressional intent
behind the Hatch-Waxman Act in drug cases, measuring the total
content of the relevant jurisprudence; 2) are individual judges, as
well as combinations and panels of judges, following these
mandates and if not, which specific judges are voting
predominately for either the brand name companies or the generic
companies; 3) whether the Congressional intent behind the
Medicare Modernization Act has affected the judges voting.
Section V describes policy implications and Section VI contains
concluding remarks.
2009]
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II. BACKGROUND INTO FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG
REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INFLUENCE.
A. The Hatch- Waxman and Medicare Modernization Amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 8
The Food and Drug Administration is the regulatory body that
controls nearly every aspect of the development and marketing of
pharmaceuticals, including clinical testing, and the safety and
effectiveness of new drugs. 9 No new drug can be marketed in the
United States without FDA approval.2" A manufacturer seeking to
market a drug that has not previously been approved by the FDA is
required by the FDCA to submit a New Drug Application
("NDA") to the FDA.2 NDAs are usually long and detailed and
must include, among other things, evidence regarding the drug's
safety and effectiveness. Additionally, information about any
patents held by the NDA that could reasonably be asserted to cover
the drug in question must be listed.22 After the NDA is approved,
the FDA is required to publish the submitted patent information in
a report called "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations," which is commonly referred to as "the
Orange Book."23
In the early 1980s, bills were introduced in Congress to expedite
generic drug approvals and to stimulate competition between
brand-name manufacturers and generics." As a result of
18. See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of
Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 51 (2003) for a
more thorough description of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and its effects.
19. See United States Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
20. See 21 U.S.C § 355(a) (2006) (requiring FDA approval for new drugs).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
22. Id.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2006); see also United States Food and
Drug Administration, Electronic Orange Book,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
24. See Frederick Tong, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent
Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (2003).
320 [Vol. XIX:2
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negotiations between members of the brand and generic drug
industries and involvement of Representative Henry Waxman and
Senator Orrin Hatch, the Hatch-Waxman legislation was enacted
on September 24, 1984.25 The Hatch-Waxman legislation "was
predicated on the desire to enhance the growth of the generic drug
industry while simultaneously extending patent protection for
brand name drugs developed by the research-based industry. 26 In
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Congress attempted to strike a
balance between two competing policy interests: (i) encouraging
the research and development of new drugs and (ii) enabling
generics to bring low-cost copies of those drugs to market. 7
For the generics, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates an efficient
regulatory method of bringing a drug to market known as an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA").28 In an ANDA, a
generic company must demonstrate its drug's "bioequivalence"
with the previously approved brand-name product. 9 However,
ANDA applicants may rely on the brand's previous studies of
safety and efficacy and do not need to repeat the clinical trials that
had been required by the FDCA.3" As a result, generics are able to
shorten the time period for approval and avoid much of the
research and development costs that would otherwise be necessary
to bring a new drug to market.
For the brands, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments continue to
provide protection to the innovator whose patent rights have yet to
expire through an array of notice provisions, among other
incentive-creating provisions.31 In order to secure FDA approval,
25. See id. at 780-82.
26. Bill to Ease Way for Generics is Introduced in the House, CHAIN DRUG
REV., June 4, 2001, at RX11.
27. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
28. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006).
29. See § 355(j)(4)(F).
30. See § 3550); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(3) (2008).
31. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide a number of other incentives
including: (i) patent term extensions to compensate for delays during regulatory
review of the brand-name product; (ii) mandatory notice by generics seeking to
challenge patents covering the brand-name drug ; (iii) up to a thirty-month stay
of generic approval during patent litigation; and (iv) market exclusivity of three
and five-year periods under special circumstances. See § 3550)(2)(B)(i),
2009]
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the ANDA applicant must certify that its generic version of the
approved drug will not interfere with any patents that the NDA
holder has listed.32 These are commonly referred to as paragraph I,
1I, III and IV certifications.33 Paragraph IV certification requires a
court's involvement to determine whether the patent is valid or
whether it will be infringed by the generic drug product.34 Under
Hatch-Waxman, filing a Paragraph IV certification is considered
an act of infringement,35 although nothing has been made, used, or
sold.
After filing a Paragraph IV certification with the FDA, an
ANDA applicant who wishes to challenge the patent during the
patent term, must give notice to the NDA-holder/patentee within
twenty days of the filing.36 The notice must include a statement
detailing the ANDA applicant's factual and legal basis of
invalidity, unenforceability, and/or non-infringement.37 If the
brand does not file an infringement action within forty-five days of
receiving the notice, "the approval [of the ANDA] shall be made
effective immediately" by the FDA.38 If the patent holder files
suit, the FDA approval is delayed thirty months from receipt of the
notice unless the district court rules on the infringement claim
within the thirty-month period or the patent expires.39 If the
district court issues a ruling during the thirty-month stay period,
the ANDA approval date is determined by the decision of the
district court, or by the decision of the appellate court, if it is
appealed.4" In short, litigation stays the FDA's ability to grant
approval of the generic's ANDA for thirty months, which prevents
the generic from marketing its drug, unless there is a holding of
non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability.
In the years following enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
legislation, both goals of the Act were being fulfilled to a certain
(5)(B)(iii)-(iv); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
32. See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
33. See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)-(iii).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
37. See § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
38. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
39. Id.
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), (I)(aa)(AA).
[Vol. XIX:2
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extent. However, the terms of the original Hatch-Waxman
Amendments created incentives for anticompetitive behavior,
including late Orange Book listings of patents unrelated to the
basic functioning of the drug, frivolous patent infringement
lawsuits, and collusive arrangements between brand and generic
companies. In response to these abuses, Congress passed the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act
("Medicare Amendments" or "MMA"), which became law on
December 8, 2003.41 Title XI of the Medicare Amendments,
entitled "Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals," implemented
significant changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act. Some of the
changes include new remedies for the generic applicant, new
requirements for the events that trigger the generic applicant's
180-day exclusivity period, and restrictions on brand-name drug
manufacturers' thirty-month stay necessary to resolve
infringement disputes involving patents listed in the Orange
Book.4 2 It is clear from the legislative history43 that the MMA was
passed with the idea that generic drug competition should be
encouraged and enhanced." This can be viewed as an indication
that the Hatch-Waxman act did not achieve the intended balance
between competing goals. The MMA can also be seen as another
attempt by Congress to achieve that balance by encouraging more
robust generic competition.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (including the amendments made to the statute by the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003)). The FDA subsequently revised its
rules to be consistent with the new legislation.
42. See W. Edward Bailey et al., Recent Hatch-Waxman Reform: Balancing
Innovation, Competition, and Affordability,
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_NA/107_110.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2009).
43. See 149 CONG. REC. S15882-03, S15885 (2003) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy, ranking member of the Senate HELP committee regarding the "civil
action to obtain patent certainty" provision under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C))
("[I]n recent years both brand-name and generic drug companies have exploited
certain aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act to delay generic competition. The
changes to the ... Act ... will stop these abuses.").
44. Commentators also view the MMA as allowing generics to compete more
effectively. See, e.g., Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the
Medicare Act Revises Hatch- Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs,
30 IOWA J. Cop. L. 309 (2005).
2009] 323
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As evidenced by the MMA, legislation to define the balance
between generic competition and new drug innovation is a difficult
and inexact task. The inherent delay between identification of a
loophole or other problems in an existing statute and the enactment
of an amendment suggests that legislation may not be the best
route to regulating the drug industry. Another option for Congress
is to draft a broad statute and allow the courts to define the
contours of the law.45 Regardless of whether Congress will
continue to tinker with drug regulation through legislation or not,
the courts will play a substantial and critical role in interpreting
and applying the statute. Given its role in patent law, the Federal
Circuit has the ability to impact the outcome in pharmaceutical
cases more than any other court.
B. The Federal Circuit46
In the last two decades, Federal Circuit has become one of the
most powerful and influential forces in the United States patent
system.47  As the patent system has grown in economic
importance,48 technological complexity,49 and public awareness,
the administration of the entire enterprise increasingly depends
45. A good example of this methodology is found in antitrust law where the
Sherman Act provides a broad prohibition against anti-competitive behavior
while allowing the courts to hash out the details. See Lawernce A. Sullivan &
Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 197, 200 (1998).
46. For a more in-depth discussion of the institutional design of the Federal
Circuit, see Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
More than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REV. 43 (1984); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1989); and Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 1107-24.
47. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit... has become the de facto supreme court of patents.").
48. See generally FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO
OWN THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY (1994) (noting the critical nature of patents in
economic development).
49. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity
of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 79 (2002) ("By almost
any measure . . . the patents issued in the late 1990s are more complex than
those issued in the 1970s.").
[Vol. XIX:2
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upon the judges of the Federal Circuit.
Even after twenty-five years, Congressional intent behind
creating the Federal Circuit is not open to debate. By the
enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("FCIA") of
1982,50 Congress unified in the Federal Circuit the appellate
jurisdiction for patent cases, 51 whether from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, the U.S. district courts, the Court of Federal
Claims, or the Court of International Trade (ITC). At the time of
enactment, the legal landscape of patent law was widely thought to
be inefficient and unpredictable. Legislators were confronted with
information that the interpretation of the patent law differed in
different parts of the country.52 Studies predating FCIA revealed
that a patent was more "likely to be held valid and infringed in the
Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times
more likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the
Second Circuit. '
53
After hearing this and other testimony, Congress determined that
national uniformity in the patent law of the United States was
desirable. National uniformity would bring uniformity of doctrinal
development,54 doctrinal stability, 55 and predictability to the law.56
The solution was the unification of patent appeals under a single
appellate jurisdiction. 7 In sum, the vesting in the Federal Circuit
50. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
51. But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002) (permitting appeals of some patent issues to return to the
regional circuits).
52. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 15 ("[P]atent law [is] an area in which the application of the law to the facts
of a case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in
substantially similar cases.").
53. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 7 (citing Thomas Cooch, The Standard of
Invention in the Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56-59
(William B. Ball ed., 1960)).
54. See S. REP. No. 97-275 at 5, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
55. See id. ("The Federal Circuit also provides a forum that will increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.").
56. See id. at 6, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 (stating that stable
and predictable law is better for the national economy).
57. See id. at 4, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14 ("The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides such a forum for appeals from
2009] 325
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of exclusive jurisdiction of patent appeals has been based on a
consistent and transparent line of reasoning. First, the Federal
Circuit, playing a unitary judicial role, will manage, develop, and
police the patent law. Second, the imposition of this institutional
design will promote a clearer, more stable and predictable patent
doctrine, which in turn will reduce forum shopping and improve
the economic usefulness of important property rights. 8
It is clear that Congress's structural goals have been met. The
Federal Circuit has moved swiftly into its role as manager,
developer, and enforcer of the patent doctrine. Without a doubt, it
has expanded its influence over the jurisprudence in a number of
doctrinal areas, including claim interpretation,59 the standard for
obviousness,6" remedies,6' procedural issues,62 anticipation,63 and
inequitable conduct.64 As such, the judges of the Federal Circuit
have a profound impact on patent law in general. As Hatch-
Waxman litigation is a subset of patent law, the Federal Circuit
judges and their policies and decisions have a large influence in
the pharmaceutical drug arena as well.
C. Questions Presented
Given the intent of Congress to improve generic-brand
competition in the drug market while also providing incentives to
the brand-name manufacturers to continue to bring new and
innovative drugs to market and the prominence of the Federal
Circuit's influence on patent law, the question becomes whether
throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there
is a special need for national uniformity.").
58. Id. at 5-6, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16; Dreyfuss, supra
note 46, at 7.
59. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11 (discussing the Federal
Circuit's development of claim-interpretation jurisprudence).
60. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEXAS L.
REV. 2051 (2007).
61. Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 18-19.
62. See id. at 30-52 (discussing some areas where the court has wielded
jurisprudential influence and concluding that the court's success was mixed).
63. Id. at 10-11.
64. Id. at 21-22.
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the Federal Circuit is correctly balancing the competing interests
that motivated Congress to pass the Hatch-Waxman Act in the first
place. Ideally, these goals would be reflected in the court's
decisions. For example, a clear preference for generic companies
or brand companies in the outcome of the cases would suggest that
Congressional intent has gone unheeded. To the contrary,
outcomes not favoring one party over the other would suggest that
the Act is being properly applied in light of Congress's wishes.
Even if the Federal Circuit as a whole is fulfilling the intent
behind Hatch-Waxman, individual judges may not be. Individual
judges who are voting for one side with regularity could cause a
number of significant consequences. First, these individuals could
be overstepping their bounds as judges and taking on roles that are
more appropriate for legislators. Second, the outcome of a case
could be dependent on the members of the panel assigned to the
case and litigators can alter strategies to play to the judges
assigned to their cases. Third, knowledge of panels could affect
the parties standing in settlement talks. Finally, questions of
judicial craftsmanship arise as, ideally, judges should apply the
law impartially.
Congress' enactment of the Medicare Amendments could be
viewed as a signal that generic competition should be more
vigorously protected. The question then becomes whether the
Federal Circuit and its judges have taken this enactment as a
signal. For instance, did the outcome of the court's decisions start
to favor generics more after enactment? Also, have individual
judges taken the signal to begin favoring generics more or have
they favored brands more, perhaps because they feel Congress has
gone too far in enabling generics?
III. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY
A. Court Opinions as Data
A key design choice faced at the outset concerned the
identification of a source of information that allowed the sort of
systematic analysis needed for this study. This study utilizes the
court's jurisprudence itself as the relevant data source, measuring
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aspects of the Federal Circuit's decision making as expressed in
written judicial decisions and voting patterns.65 Unlike traditional
legal research, the data was collected and analyzed more
systematically and by more rigid criteria. Given the object of the
study - to analyze whether the court is balancing the competing
interests of generic and brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers
while developing a clear, coherent, and predictable jurisprudence -
measuring the jurisprudence and voting patterns is likely to
provide the necessary insights.
B. Population
The population for this study includes all Federal Circuit
decisions that involve a pharmaceutical ANDA filer being sued for
infringement under § 271(e) reported from the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act on September 24, 1984 through March 26,
2009. This is a population, as opposed to a sample, because every
opinion is included, whether or not it was designated "for
publication" under the Federal Circuit Rules. However, the
population is limited to decisions involving the Hatch-Waxman
Act and pharmaceuticals. It includes all aspects of § 271(e)
infringement suits, including jurisdictional 66 and substantial
rulings, as well as suits against the FDA involving application of
the Act. It does not include the §271(e)(1) research exception for
65. This is a commonly used method. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11,
at 746; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 1126 & n.82.
66. A majority of the included jurisdictional rulings were requests for
declaratory judgments that would allow the generic to challenge patents in order
to enter the market for a given drug. As such, these rulings are included in the
study because a judge that favors either side of the pharmaceutical argument can
use jurisdiction to allow generic competition (by allowing the challenge) or
prevent it (by dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds). On this front, the
Federal Circuit as a whole has moved from normally disallowing these
challenges towards allowing challenges by generics. Compare Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir.2005) (affirming district
court's holding of no Article III standing because there was no reasonable
apprehension of suit) with Caraco Pharm. Labs. v. Forest Labs., 527 F.3d 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing and remanding district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because there was a case or controversy under all
circumstances test). This may be due to an intervening ruling in the Supreme
Court. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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medical device cases or cases that were purely related to civil
procedure matters. Finally, the measure of this study is by
opinion, not by case or patent. In all, this population contains 176
different written opinions from 136 titled cases decided by 110
different three-judge panels. The 176 opinions include 126
majority opinions (including 5 per curium opinions and 2 opinions
written by judges sitting by designation), 12 concurrences, 30
dissents (including 11 dissents from denial of rehearing or
rehearing en banc), and 8 concurring-dissenting opinions.
C. Data Collected
For each case, the following was cataloged:
" Case name, citation, and date of decision
" Precedential weight
* Patentee and ANDA Filer
" Patent(s)-at-issue
* Brand and generic name of the patented drug
* Federal Circuit judges on the panel
* Opinion-writing judge
* Any concurring or dissenting opinions, their authors, and
outcomes
* Issue(s) on appeal, including: jurisdiction; preliminary
injunction; claim construction; infringement (literal and
doctrine of equivalents); obviousness; anticipation; on-
sale bar; § 112 issues ((best mode, enablement, written
description, or indefiniteness); double patenting;
inequitable conduct; reissue problems; term extension;
Hatch-Waxman interpretation issues"
* Whether the finder of fact was a jury, judge in a bench
trial, a judge ruling on a pre-trial motion, or a judge
granting judgment as a matter of law
67. See, e.g, Pfizer, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 1365-66
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing district court's holding of non-infringement because
patent extension under Hatch-Waxman amendments applied to the drug's active
ingredient, not only the identified salt). But see id. at 1367 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (would have affirmed district court because Hatch-Waxman statute
should be interpreted to limit the patent term extension to the specific product
that was subject to FDA approval).
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* Whether the lower court was reversed or affirmed
* Who the outcome favored (generic or patentee)
* A short synopsis of the outcome and reasoning of the
case
Some of this data is of little importance to the current study but
was collected to enable additional studies in the future.
D. Methodology
As this study containd a well-defined population and all the
members of that population were included in the data set, the
normal tests designed to evaluate the statistical significance of data
do not apply.68 Within the population, all the numbers reproduced
here are by definition "statistically significant."69  Thus, the
majority of the data discussed are descriptive statistics about the
population; such as what percentage of the time that a particular
judge's vote favored generic or brand companies. These
descriptive statistics also include data relating one variable to
another, for example, comparing how judges' voting patterns
changed over time. These statistics are interesting for what they
reveal about the population of Federal Circuit ANDA decisions in
the past twenty-five years. As a matter of statistical inference,
however, they do not predict anything about future cases.
Methods that would enable predictions about future decisions were
beyond the scope of this paper, but may be done in the future.7"
Outcome was determined to be "pro-generic" when the decision
allowed the FDA to grant the generic's ANDA and "pro-brand" if
the decision prevented the generic from entering the market. For
example, in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan
Laboratories., Inc.,7 the Federal Circuit (Rader, Michel, Linn, JJ.)
affirmed the district court's holdings of no inequitable conduct,
68. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity ofLitigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 201 (1998).
69. However, such differences may nevertheless be small enough to have no
practical significance to lawyers.
70. Two examples of predictive methodologies are the "superpopulation"
approach and binary logistic regression analysis. See Allison & Lemley, supra
note 11, at 749 (for the "superpopulation" approach); Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 11, at 1164 (for the binary logistic regression analysis).
71. 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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non-obviousness and enablement. All of these holdings favor the
brand, as they keep the patent valid which bars the FDA from
approving the generic's ANDA. As such, this case was coded as
pro-brand and the opinion writer (Rader, J.) and those who joined
it (Michel & Linn, JJ.) were scored accordingly in the database.
As another example, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,72 the Federal
Circuit (Michel, Mayer, Linn, JJ.) reversed the district court's
holding of infringement and non-obviousness and held the claims
obvious. This case was coded pro-generic because the holding of
invalidity would allow the FDA to approve the generic's ANDA,
which, in turn, allows them to market their drug.
Cases that were not the final determination of the issues (e.g.
remands) were coded based on whether the decision made it more
or less likely for the generic's ANDA to be granted. More
specifically, if the district court held the patent invalid, not
infringed, or unenforceable73 and the Federal Circuit panel
reversed and remanded, the opinion would be classified as pro-
brand. For example, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel
Pharmaceuticals., Inc.," the Federal Circuit (Rader, Plager,
Gajarsa, JJ.) vacated and remanded the district court's summary
judgment of non-infringement because a factual question related to
the scope of surrendered equivalents existed. This opinion was
coded pro-brand because the decision could allow the brand to
prevent the generic's ANDA from granting if they could win on
remand.75 In other words, the decision is pro-brand because the
FDA could have granted the generic's ANDA but for the Federal
Circuit panel reversing the district court. On the other hand, if the
district court held the patent infringed, not invalid, and not
unenforceable,76 and the Federal Circuit panel reversed and
remanded on all of these issues, the opinion would be classified as
72. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
73. Any one of these holdings would allow the FDA to grant the generic's
ANDA application, which would allow the generic to market its drug as long as
other patents were not barring market entry.
74. 356 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75. The actual outcomes below on remand, while interesting, do not provide
any insight into how the Federal Circuit judges decide ANDA cases. As such,
the actual outcomes on remand were not studied.
76. All three holdings would be necessary to bar a generic's ANDA from
being approved, assuming each ground was asserted in the litigation.
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pro-generic.77  For example, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Pharmachemie B.V.,78 the Federal Circuit (Bryson, Michel,
Newman, JJ.) vacated the district court's holding of obviousness-
type double patenting and remanded because of a convoluted
factual scenario. This opinion was coded pro-generic because it
was possible for the generic company to invalidate the patent on
remand, which would allow for the FDA to approve its ANDA.
These classifications are appropriate because the focus of this
study is on the Federal Circuit judges in ANDA litigations. By
reversing and remanding in the above scenarios, the panel enabled
a party who was disadvantaged by the district court to have
another chance to win the case. Therefore, the opinion is properly
classified as favoring the party who was previously disadvantaged
by the district court's opinion.
Certain opinions held for the brand on some issues and the
generic on others. These cases cause some analytical problems, as
they may be a result of compromise between the panelists, an
indication of the panel's interpretation and application of the law,
or a way for the author to "split the baby" and favor neither side.
However, the focus of this paper is whether the competing goals of
Congress are being met. With this focus, these split issue opinions
can be classified based on whether generic competition is
increased (by allowing FDA approval of the ANDA) or decreased
(thereby enhancing the brands incentive to innovate). Given these
considerations, split-issue opinions were classified as pro-generic
if they allowed the generic to market the drug and pro-brand if the
decision barred the FDA from approving the generic's ANDA.79
For example, in Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., °
the Federal Circuit (Rader, Schall, Linn, JJ.) affirmed the district
77. If the Federal Circuit only reversed and remanded as to one of the issues,
the case would be classified as split (pro-generic) as discussed infra.
78. 361 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Judge Newman dissented, arguing for
more deference to the United States Patent and Trademark Office which had
already determined that double patenting was not a problem. See id. at 1350-55
(Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman's dissent was coded pro-brand as her
holding would have made the patent valid and enforceable, thereby preventing
the generic from marketing its drug.
79. In the case of remands, the decisions were appropriately coded if they
increased or decreased the likelihood of ANDA approval as discussed above.
80. 417 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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court's holding of inequitable conduct in prosecuting one patent,
but did not find that it infected a related patent that was terminally
disclaimed to the unenforceable patent. Although one patent was
held unenforceable (a pro-generic result), the generic would still
be barred from entering the market because of the valid patent (a
pro-brand result). As such, this decision was classified as "split
(pro-brand)" because the FDA would not be able to approve the
generic's ANDA.81 On the other hand, in In re Omeprazole Patent
Litigation,82 the Federal Circuit (Rader, Schall, Newman, JJ.)
affirmed the district court's holding of infringement (pro-brand)
but also affirmed the invalidity of the patent under the inherent
anticipation doctrine(pro-generic).83 The majority opinion was
classified as "split (pro-generic)" because the FDA would be able
to approve the generic's ANDA as the patent listed in the Orange
Book was held invalid.84
All of the opinions in the study were classified according to this
coding method. Each judge's voting and writing patterns were
tabulated in a spreadsheet. Various numerical and statistical
manipulations were performed using a standard spreadsheet
program to arrive at the data and representations presented
herein.85
E. Limitations
A challenge to this methodology is that judges may not be "pro-
brand" or "pro-generic" at all and may be simply following the
law. However, even if they are "following the law," many patent
law issues have conflicting doctrines and case law that allows a
81. In all, fourteen other majority opinions were classified as split (pro-
brand).
82. 483 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
83. Judge Newman dissented from this part of the opinion and would have
reversed the inherent anticipation holding. See id. at 1376 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). As such, her concurring/dissenting
opinion in this case was classified as pro-brand.
84. In all, eleven other majority opinions were classified as split (pro-
generic).
85. The most complex calculation done in the software was determining
standard deviations. Other manipulations include averaging and calculating
percentages.
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judge with a particular view can choose a doctrine or case that
favors his/her viewpoint. Voting records over a large enough data
set should demonstrate the individual judge's stance in the ANDA
arena. Also, this methodology provides a relatively objective
method of determining a judge's viewpoint, rather than reading
into the tealeaves or psychoanalyzing a judge's position of the
words and phrases in judicial opinions.86 Furthermore, judge's
agendas are rarely written into their opinions.87 Finally, this
approach allows for the management of the large amount of data
generated in this study.
There are inherent limitations in converting written opinions into
numbers and statistics.88 For example, how a case should be
characterized sometimes requires an exercise of judgment (as
described above). Others may disagree with some assignments
one way or the other. However, there is no reason to believe that
evaluations of these cases are biased in any systematic way.
The data set is limited by the inherent nature of the litigation
process as well. The skill of the lawyers on each side, the
procedural posture of the case, the interest and skill of the judges,
adequacy of the record, financial resources of the parties, and
quality of the patent itself are all likely to affect the outcome in at
least some cases. In analyzing the output of judicial opinions, this
study did not seek to account for various inputs that might have
affected the outcome or reasoning, such as the quality of
arguments, strategic choices by parties, or even strategic behavior
by judges.89
86. See Allsion & Lemley, supra note 11, at 745 n. 1 ("it isn't necessary to
notify counsel regarding who will be sitting; and it is a little demeaning, frankly
... when lawyers go running around psychoanalyzing judges by reading the tea
leaves in their opinions ahead of time" (quoting Hon. Howard T. Markey,
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Address at The
First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (May 20, 1983), in 100 FED. RULES DECISIONS 499, 511-12)).
87. But see, Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc, Newman, Lourie, and Rader, JJ.,
discuss the significance of the panel's holding of obviousness on the conduct of
R&D and brand companies not being able to commercialize new products).
88. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 68, at 203; Allison & Lemley, supra
note 11, at 748-49; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 1128.
89. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
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An additional bias may result from the nature of the appellate
process. Courts of appeals are more likely to write and publish
opinions in cases in which they reverse the district court than in
cases in which they affirm, for the simple reason that at least some
affirmances can rely heavily on the prior opinion of the district
court. To some extent this bias is controlled as this study includes
written opinions designated "not for publication" as well as
published opinions and "summary affirmances" under Federal
Circuit Rule 36.90
Analyzing the content of judicial opinions assumes that the
expression in a given opinion accurately reflects the actual process
by which the result was reached. There is at least some reason to
question this assumption,9' if for no other reason than the author of
the opinion is primarily concerned with "justifying her conclusion
by showing that it proceeds from accepted sources by legitimate,
properly argued steps."92 The presence of multiple causative facts
specific to particular cases cannot effectively be taken into account
in a study of this type. The final outcome of the case is being
tested. Judges may agree on the final outcome even though they
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 23-30 (1993)
(describing how judges' motivations can affect judicial decisions).
90. The rule reads in its entirety:
Entry of Judgment - Judgment of Affirmance Without
Opinion. The court may enter a judgment of affirmance
without opinion, citing this rule, when it determines that any
of the following conditions exist and an opinion would have
no precedential value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of
the trial court appealed from is based on findings that are not
clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting the jury's
verdict is sufficient; (c) the record supports summary
judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings; (d)
the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance
under the standard of review in the statute authorizing the
petition for review; or (e) a judgment or decision has been
entered without an error of law.
FED. CIR. R. 36.
91. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health
Insurance Coverage: Trompe L 'Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV.
49, 61-68 (1998) (identifying small sample size, long time lags, selection bias,
publication bias, and unstated rationales as the limitations of a judicial dataset).
92. Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law
Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REv. 792, 801 (1991).
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disagree on the reasoning (without writing a concurrence). As
such, the concurring-in-silence judge would be lumped into
whatever category the writer of the opinion was in this case.
However, this limitation is less likely to burden this study because
the Federal Circuit judges have shown little hesitancy in writing
concurring or dissenting opinions, even though they are supposed
to be unifying patent law.
Furthermore, any use of the voting patterns in this study as
predictors will also be limited by the fact that they assume static
laws. As the focus of the law changes, outcomes of previous cases
are of less predictive value. For example, the Supreme Court
recently disapproved of the Federal Circuit's rigid test for
obviousness.93 Many of the obviousness cases in this study were
decided under this rigid regime.94 The outcome of these cases may
be different if they were tried under the new KSR regime. This
would undermine my thesis to a degree because a judge's
viewpoint should not shift based on changing law. However,
judges take their responsibilities seriously and cannot outright
disobey Supreme Court direction. As such, judges may
begrudgingly apply the new test in a way that results in an
outcome against their viewpoint. However, judges could find
other avenues within the new regimes to arrive at a more palatable
outcome. For example, in the obviousness context, a pro-brand
judge may weigh secondary considerations (such as unexpected
results) more heavily in a given case to overcome a presumption of
obviousness.
While these limitations may couch this study, they do not
eliminate its validity or its worth. Developing and using a
relatively objective standard to code a relatively large set of cases
overcome many of these limitations. Furthermore, some of these
limitations will be present in any study using opinions as data and
cannot be removed.
93. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-18 (2007).
94. Some of the patents in these cases were deemed non-obvious solely
because the rigid "Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation" ("TSM") test was not
met. See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 391 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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IV. RESULTS
A. Judges in the Population
Twenty-five Federal Circuit judges (active or senior status)
participated in at least one ANDA decision during the period of the
study.95 As of this writing (March 2009), twelve active judges96 and
four senior judges9 7 in the study remained on the bench. Some of
the judges in the study participated98 in relatively few cases for a
variety of reasons: some died or left the bench sometime after the
study began; others were appointed during the period of the study;
still others took senior status and did not have a full docket during
this period. As a result, ten of the judges in the study participated
in fewer than five decisions.99 The remainder participated in
somewhere between thirteen and forty-one decisions in the
population. Of the twenty-five participating judges, twenty-one
wrote at least one opinion included in the study."' The median
number of written opinions (four) was fairly low, however. Only
six judges wrote ten or more opinions.'0 ' The full list of
participations and writings is reprinted in Table 1.
One of the most striking findings about Federal Circuit decisions
in ANDA cases is the apparent specialization of the court. A
95. They are: Judges Archer, Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Bryson, Clevenger,
Cowen, Dyk, Friedman, Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Markey, Mayer, Michel, Moore,
Newman, Nies, Plager, Prost, Rader, Rich, Schall, Skelton, and Smith.
96. They are: Judges Bryson, Dyk, Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Mayer, Michel,
Moore, Newman, Prost, Rader, and Schall.
97. They are: Judges Archer, Clevenger, Friedman, and Plager.
98. Participation in a case is defined as a judge having served on the panel
that produced a decision in the study and having either written or signed onto
the majority opinion, or written or signed onto a concurrence or dissent.
Writing or signing onto a dissent to a rehearing denial was also counted as a
participation. However, voting to deny rehearing was not counted as a
participation.
99. They are: Judges Baldwin, Bennett, Bissell, Cowen, Markey, Moore,
Nies, Rich, Skelton, and Smith.
100. The judges who did not write an opinion are Judges Bennett, Cowen,
Skelton, and Smith. Also Judge Bissel's only opinion was a dissent.
101. They are: Judges Dyk (11), Gajarsa (20), Lourie (23), Newman (19),
Rader (26), and Schall (12).
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relatively small number of judges have taken responsibility for
writing a large proportion of the patent opinions produced by the
court. This study includes 399 participations and 176 opinions 112
altogether. Among the judges that participated in over ten cases,
Judge Lourie wrote opinions in 23 of 30 cases in which he
participated (76.7%). Also, Judge Rader wrote 26 opinions in 38
participations (68.4%), Judge Dyk wrote in 11 of 17 participations
(64.7%), and Judge Newman wrote in 19 of 31 participations
(61.3%). By contrast, Judge Friedman wrote only 3 opinions in 13
cases (23.1%), Judge Linn wrote 3 opinions in 14 cases (21.4%),
and Judge Clevenger wrote 3 opinions in 19 participations
(15.8%). If opinion writing is a measure of influence, 13 a
relatively small number of judges have a significant influence on
the ANDA patent law.0 4 Collectively, Judges Rader, Lourie, and
Gajarsa wrote 70 of the 176 opinions (39.8%) in the study; a group
of six judges wrote over 63% of the opinions."l 5 Looking at
binding outcomes, Judge Rader has written 20 majority opinions in
the 129 binding decisions (15.5%) while three judges (Rader,
Lourie, and Gajarsa) account for 52 of the majority opinions
(40.3%). As such, it is fair to say that some judges have been
more influential in the ANDA arena than others.
102. This includes majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, including 8
dissents from denial of rehearing or rehearing en banc. The five per curium,
three summary affirmances under R. 36, and two designee-written majority
opinions are also included for voting determinations of the Federal Circuit as a
whole.
103. See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, & Michael Solimine,
Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
104. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 753 (drawing a similar
conclusion in patent validity cases).
105. Judges Rader (26), Lourie (24), Gajarsa (20), Newman (19), Schall (12),
and Dyk (11) accounted for 112 of the 176 written opinions (63.6%).
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Table 1. Participation and Authorship of Opinions
Federal Circuit Judges
Archer 15 4 0 0 4
Baldwin 2 1 0 0 1
Bennett 1 0 0 0 0
Bissell 1 0 0 1 1
Bryson 27 6 1 0 7
Clevenger 19 3 0 0 3
Cowen 3 0 0 0 0
Dyk 17 5 1 5 11
Friedman 13 1 1 1 3
Gajarsa 41 15 3 2 20
Linn 14 2 1 0 3
Lourie 30 17 0 6 23
Markey 1 1 0 0 1
Mayer 25 3 0 5 8
Michel 30 9 0 0 9
Moore 4 1 0 0 1
Newman 31 8 0 11 19
Nies 2 2 0 0 2
Plager 16 5 1 0 6
Prost 26 6 1 1 8
Rader 38 20 2 4 26
Rich 2 1 0 0 1
Schall 29 9 1 2 12
Skelton 1 0 0 0 0
Smith 2 0 0 0 0
Per
curium
Designee 8 2 0 0 2
as well as106. Includes concurring-in-part/dissenting-in-part opinions,
dissents from denial of rehearing petitions.
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Looking at the panels as a whole, 110 distinct panels heard
ANDA cases in the study. Only ten of the panels heard more than
one ANDA case covered in the study. Two different panels heard
four different ANDA cases, which was the most any panel heard
together.0 7 Furthermore, 120 two-judge combinations heard at
least one ANDA case with the average being 3.0 cases. Only three
two-judge combinations heard ten or more cases together.0 8 Any
conclusions regarding panels or two-judge combinations, such as
influence of one judge over another, are tenuous, at best, given the
low recurrence of panels or two judge combinations.
In addition to analyzing the votes of individual judges, judges
with some patent background or experience before joining the
court were distinguished from judges without such a
background. 9 A judge is defined as having a patent background if
they had regularly practiced patent law, or if they had a scientific
or technical expertise. Nine of the twenty-five judges in the study
have a patent background; sixteen did not."' One could argue that
107. The two panels were: Judges Friedman, Gajarsa, and Mayer (holding
for the brand in three cases) and Judges Gajarsa, Prost, and Rader (also holding
for the brand in three cases).
108. They are: Judges Gajarsa & Rader (11, 54.6% pro-brand), Judges
Gajarsa & Prost (12, 58.3% pro-generic), and Judges Prost & Rader (13, 69.2%
pro-brand).
109. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 751 (employing the same
grouping to study Federal Circuit judge voting in validity cases).
110. The judges with patent law backgrounds are: Judge Baldwin, who has a
degree in biology and served on the C.C.P.A from 1968 until 1982; Judge
Gajarsa, who has a degree in electrical engineering and practiced patent law
before his appointment; Judge Linn, who has a degree in electrical engineering
and practiced patent law before his appointment; Judge Lourie, who has an
advanced degree in chemistry, was corporate counsel for SmithKline Beecham,
practiced and wrote about patent law before his appointment; Judge Markey,
who has an advanced degree in patent law, practiced patent law before his
appointment, wrote about patent law, and served on the C.C.P.A. from 1972
until 1982; Judge Moore, who has a degree in electrical engineering and taught
and practiced patent law; Judge Newman, who has an advanced degree in
chemistry, was a research chemist and a patent lawyer before her appointment;
Judge Rader, who was counsel to the Senate subcommittee on patents,
copyrights and trademarks, and has written on patent law; and Judge Rich, who
helped draft the 1952 Patent Act, taught and practiced patent law, and served on
the C.C.P.A. from 1956 until 1982. Judge Nies is not included in this group,
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judges with a patent background could have a different viewpoint
based on his or her experience than those without or that judges
without patent law experience may be deferential to those with
experience. Interestingly, these nine judges (24% of the judges in
the study) accounted for 163 of 399 (40.9%) of the participations
and wrote 96 of 176 (54.5%) opinions. This suggests that the non-
patent experienced judges defer to the experienced judges for
writing opinions."' This deference is more pronounced if one
considers that three of the nine judges (Baldwin, Markey, and
Rich) dealt with relatively few ANDA cases and are no longer on
the bench and that Judge Moore has had limited opportunity to
participate in these cases as she was recently appointed (2006) to
the Federal Circuit. Together, these four judges account for only
nine participations and four opinions. Removing these four judges
leaves five judges (20%) with patent law experience accounting
for 38.6% of the participations and 52.3% of the opinions. Again,
these five judges (Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Newman, and Rader) are
quite influential in ANDA litigation.
B. ANDA Cases
A common assumption among patent lawyers in ANDA
litigation is that different judges have different inclinations
towards generic and brand pharmaceutical manufacturers. The
individual judges, as well as the groups identified above, were
tested to see if their voting and opinion writing demonstrated any
patterns in ANDA cases.
Looking at binding outcomes (i.e., majority opinions and
summary affirmances) from the Federal Circuit, 71 of the 129
cases (55.0%) have favored the brand/innovator. If all written
opinions are included, 97 of 176 opinions (55.1%) have favored
the brands. These numbers suggest that the Federal Circuit, as a
because her prior intellectual property experience was not patent-related and
gave her no familiarity to the issues presented in patent litigation or prosecution.
111. Allison & Lemley saw a similar phenomenon in validity cases. See
Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 752-53. As in Allison & Lemley's study,
the results could be explained by the greater interest of such judges writing
concurrences and dissents. However, these judges wrote 67 of 126 majority
opinions (53.2%), which is similar to the amount of overall opinions (54.5%).
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whole, has slightly favored brand pharmaceutical companies over
generic companies in ANDA cases. This also suggests that the
Federal Circuit is not straying too far from the Congressional
intent behind the Hatch-Waxman and Medicare Amendments of
providing generic competition while incentivizing innovation by
the brands. However, the overall performance of the court does
not necessarily mean that all the judges do not have their own
individual voting patterns; the "pro-brand" and "pro-generic"
judges could simply cancel each other out.
Comparing the voting patterns of patent-experienced judges
versus non-experienced judges reveals an interesting trend. Judges
with prior patent experience voted in favor of the brand companies
104 of 163 times (63.8%), while judges without patent experience
voted in favor of brand companies 114 of 227 times (50.2%). As
such, judges with patent experience were somewhat more likely
(13.6%) to find in favor of brands than judges without such
experience. This discrepancy may reflect the more pro-patentee
stance that would be expected of prior practitioners and patent law
professors. On the other hand, the non-experienced group may be
less influenced by their backgrounds and may focus more on
Congressional intent behind the acts that they are enforcing and
interpreting, which is borne out in the nearly balanced voting
record in ANDA cases. Coupled with their large amount of
opinions and participations, the judges with patent-experience and
"pro-brand" stance may have an interesting effect on future
litigation considering that 50% of the current roster of active
judges on the Federal Circuit has patent law experience." 2
Looking at individual judges voting patterns, it was difficult to
categorize judges as either "pro-generic" or "pro-brand." Of the
fifteen judges who participated in more than ten ANDA
decisions,"3 the majority came quite close to the average pro-brand
voting rate of 55.6%."' The
112. This assumes that trends will continue and that this study has a scintilla
of predictive value. However, as discussed earlier, predictions made from the
historical data in this study are tenuous, at best.
113. These fifteen judges accounted for 371 of the 399 participations
(93.0%) in the study and, therefore, are representative of the entire study.
114. This percentage differs slightly from the overall percentages identified
earlier in the study because participations are being measured, not cases or
342 [Vol. XIX:2
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complete list of votes and generic outcomes are detailed in Table
2. There were a few outliers as six judges (Rader, Newman, Linn,
Friedman, Clevenger, and Mayer) fell outside one standard
deviation from the mean. On the brand side, Judge Rader voted
pro-brand in 30 of 38 cases (79.0%), Judge Newman voted pro-
brand in 24 of 31 participations (77.4%), Judge Linn voted pro-
brand in 10 of 14 cases (71.4%), and Judge Friedman voted pro-
brand in 9 of 13 cases
Table 2. Pro-Generic Votes
.patcptn ast -f.
Archer 46.7%
Baldwin 2 0 0.0%
Bennett 1 1 100.0%
Bissell 1 0 0.0%
Bryson 27 14 51.9%
Clevenger 19 11 57.9%
Cowen 3 1 33.3%
Dyk 17 9 52.9%
Friedman 13 4 30.8%
Gajarsa 41 23 56.1%
Linn 14 4 28.6%
Lourie 30 14 46.7%
Markey 1 1 100.0%
Mayer 25 15 60.0%
Michel 30 12 40.0%
Moore 4 2 50.0%
Newman 31 7 22.6%
Nies 2 0 0.0%
Plager 16 9 56.3%
Prost 26 12 46.2%
opinions, as the denominator. The ratios may differ because some decisions
included a dissent, because some cases were decided en banc, and because some
cases were decided with the participation of only two Federal Circuit judges.
2009]
29
Masar: Effects of the Federal Circuit Judges on Hatch-Waxman Litigation
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH & IP LAW
Rader 38 8 21.1%
Rich 2 1 50.0%
Schall 29 14 48.3%
Skelton 1 1 100.0%
Smith 2 2 100.0%
(69.2%). On the generic side, Judge Mayer voted in favor of
generics in 15 of 25 cases (60.0%), Judge Clevenger voted in favor
of generics in 11 of 19 cases (57.9%). Judges Plager (56.3%) and
Gajarsa (56.1%) favored generics in their voting as well, though
within one standard deviation from the mean. Aside from the
judges discussed above, the voting patterns of the other judges do
not seem to support their characterization as necessarily "pro-
generic" or "pro-brand" based on voting alone given the small
deviation from the average.
As judges appear to relax their preferences somewhat when
joining opinions,"5 looking at opinion writing may provide a better
insight into the judges' stances in ANDA cases. Of the eleven
judges who wrote more than five opinions,' 16 the majority came
quite close to the average pro-brand opinion writing rate of 50.8%.
The complete list of opinions and generic outcomes are detailed in
Table 3. Five judges (Bryson, Newman, Dyk, Mayer, and Gajarsa)
opinions favoring one side or the other fell outside one standard
deviation from the mean. On the brand side, Judge Bryson wrote
pro-brand in 6 of 7 opinions (85.7%) and Judge Newman wrote
pro-brand in 16 of 19 opinions (84.2%). On the generic side,
Judge Gajarsa wrote pro-generic opinions 15 out of 20 total
(75.0%), Judge Mayer wrote 6 of 8 opinions (75.0%) favoring
generics, and Judge Dyk wrote pro-generic in 8 of 11 opinions
(72.7%). Notably, Judge Rader wrote 19 of 26 opinions (73.1%)
favoring the brand, which was approximately one standard
deviation from the mean.
Given their large deviation from the average in both voting and
115. Another commentator has seen this trend in choices between claim
construction methodologies in Federal Circuit judges. See Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 1158.
116. These eleven judges accounted for 149 of the 176 participations
(84.7%) in the study and, therefore, are representative of the entire study.
[Vol. XIX:2
30
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/5
HA TCH- WAXMAN LITIGATION
opinion writing as shown in Figure 1,17 Judges Newman (pro-
brand: 77.4% votes, 84.2% opinions) and Mayer (pro-
117. Judges with ten or more participations were included in Figure 1. The
trendline is drawn to voting records. Because of the limited number of opinions
written by some of the judges, the writing data series may appear to give
disparate results in some cases.
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Table 3. Pro-Generic 0pinions.
Archer 4 3 75.0%
Baldwin 1 0 0.0%
Bennett 0 0 n/a
Bissell 1 0 0.0%
Bryson 7 1 14.3%
Clevenger 3 2 66.7%
Cowen 0 0 n/a
Dyk 11 8 72.7%
Friedman 3 1 33.3%
Gajarsa 20 15 75.0%
Linn 3 1 33.3%
Lourie 23 11 47.8%
Markey 1 1 100.0%
Mayer 8 6 75.0%
Michel 9 4 44.4%
Moore 1 0 0.0%
Newman 19 3 15.8%
Nies 2 0 0.0%
Plager 6 3 50.0%
Prost 8 4 50.0%
Rader 26 7 26.9%
Rich 1 0 0.0%
Schall 12 7 58.3%
Skelton 0 0 n/a
Smith 0 0 n/a
generic: 60.0% votes, 75.0% opinions) have displayed a
propensity for favoring one side in ANDA litigations in past cases.
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Furthermore, the past performances of Judges Rader (pro-brand)
and Gajarsa (pro-generic) appear to favor one side when one
considers the combination of their voting and opinion writing
records and the large number of cases that they have been involved
in. For example, Judge Rader participated in thirty-eight cases and
voted for brands in 78.9% of his cases and wrote pro-brand in
73.1% of his opinions. Similarly, Judge Gajarsa participated in
forty-one cases and voted pro-generic in 56.1% of his cases and
wrote pro-generic in 75.0% of his opinions. In addition, Judges
Clevenger (pro-generic), Linn (pro-brand), and Friedman (pro-
brand) have shown a moderate preference for one side in a lesser
number of cases. For example, in nineteen cases, Judge Clevenger
voted pro-generic 57.9% and wrote pro-generic 66.7% of the time,
Judge Linn voted pro-brand 71.4% and wrote pro-brand 66.7% in
fourteen participations, and Judge Friedman voted pro-brand
69.2% and wrote pro-brand 66.7% of the time in thirteen cases.
However, none of these three judges have either their voting or
writing patterns outside one standard deviation from the respective
means. Also, each judge has written only three opinions. As such,
any inference of a preference is less so than the other judges
identified. The other nine judges with ten or more participations
have not shown a strong preference for one side or the other when
looking at their voting records and opinion writing.
Instead of focusing on the entire dataset, a number of interesting
trends arise when the data set is separated into pre- and post-
Medicare Amendments time frames. Most, if not all, of the cases
in this study do not apply the law under the Medicare Amendments
(MMA) because a majority of the provisions of the MMA are not
retroactive and the ANDAs were filed prior to the enactment date
set in the MMA. However, the reasoning and goals behind the act
(i.e., to further aid generic competition with brands) may be
influencing the judges. A comparison of pre- and post-MMA
voting, opinion writing and outcomes are detailed in Table 4.1 is
Overall, the voting of the court went from 52.8% pro-brand prior
to the MMA to 57.3% pro-brand after enactment. Interestingly,
the number of binding opinions favored brands 56.7% of the time
post-MMA, up from 52.7% pre-MMA. Overall opinions favored
118. This table includes all twelve active status judges and all four senior
status judges that comprise the current Federal Circuit.
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brands 54.4% of the time pre-MMA as to 54.7% post-MMA.
These results show that the court has shifted pro-brand in its
binding outcomes and suggests the number of dissents and
concurrences are being written supporting generics has risen since
2003.
Looking at the ten judges 19 that had seven or more
participations pre- and post-enactment of the MMA, 120 some
judges have solidified their stance on one side of the debate or the
other in recent years. For example, Judge Gajarsa has voted pro-
generic in 66.7% of his cases since the MMA compared to 35.7%
pre-MMA and has written pro-generic in 85.7% of his opinions
post-MMA compared to 40.0% pre-MMA. Judge Mayer has also
moved more strongly pro-generic since the MMA: voting 72.7%
post-MMA vs. 56.3% pre-MMA. On the brand side,
Table 4. Comparison of Pre- and Post-Medicare
.n _ A a- . _ . ... . . 2
Archer 37.5% (8) 57.1% (7) 100.0% (1) 66.7% (3)
Bryson 53.9% 50.0% 0.00% (2) 20.0% (5)
__________ (13) (14) ______ _____
Clevenger 72.7% 37.5% (8) 66.7% (3) n/a
_______ 1_ 011) 1_____ 1____ 1_ _______
119. These judges are: Bryson (13 pre, 14 post); Clevenger (11, 8); Gajarsa
(14, 27); Lourie (14, 16); Mayer (16, 11); Michel (14, 17); Newman (13, 17);
Plager (9, 7); Rader (13, 24); and Schall (13, 16).
120. The dividing line was December 8, 2003, the date of enactment. This
may be a bit arbitrary, as this requires the Federal Circuit judges had knowledge
that the act passed and the Congressional intent behind the act. This is
especially true in the two cases decided in December 2003. See Pharmacia &
Upjohn Co. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 85 F. App'x 205 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23,
2003); In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 84 F. App'x 76 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11,
2003). However, any line would be arbitrary due to the fact that the influence
of the act is being implied and is not a direct correlation to the law being in
effect.
121. The number in parentheses represents the number of votes or opinions
for the judge in that category.
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Dyk 0.0%(5) 66.7% 0.0%(2) 77.8% (9)
__________ ~~(12) __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-Friedman 42.9% (7) 16.7% (6) 0.0%(1) 50.0% (2)
Gajarsa 35.7% 66.7% 40.0% (5) 85.7% (14)
___ _ ___ (14) (27) _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
Linn 0.0%(3) 36.4% 0.0%(2) 50.0% (2)
_____________ __________ (11) _______
Lourie 78.6% 18.8% 72.7%(11) 25.0%(12)(14) (16) __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Mayer 56.3% 72.7% 60.0% (5) 100.0% (3)
___ __ _  __ (16) (11) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Michel 42.9% 41.2% 0.0%(3) 66.7%(6)(14) (17) 0.0% (3) _6.7 _(6
Moore n/a 50.0% (4) n/a 0.0%(1)
Newman 38.5% 11.8% 25.0%(8) 10.0%(10)Newman____ (13) (17) 2._() 0°_(1
Plager 66.7% (9) 42.9% (7) 50.0% (4) 50.0% (2)
Prost 0.0%(4) 57.1% n/a 50.0% (8)
__________ (21)_ _ _ _ _
Rader 30.8% 16.7% 33.3%(9) 25.0%(16)Rader____ (13) (24) 3.%()20%16
Schail 61.5% 37.5% 66.7%(6) 50.0%(6)
.... __Sh__ l (13) (16) 66.7% (6) 0.0 _(6
Judge Newman has voted pro-brand in 88.2% of her cases post-
MMA versus. 61.5% pre-MMA and 90.0% of her opinions are
favorable to the brand companies since the MMA compared to
75.0% pre-MMA. Also, Judge Rader has voted pro-brand 83.3%
of the time post-MMA versus. 69.2% of the time pre-MMA, and
75.0% of his opinions have favored brands post-MMA as opposed
to 66.7% pre-MMA.
Other judges who appear relatively impartial from their
entire voting and writing records show a severe trend shift when
their decisions are examined pre- and post-MMA. Judge Lourie
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Figure 2. Comparison of Pro-Generic Voting Pre- and Post-
MMA.
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
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30.0%
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MPost-MMA
MPre-MMA
r Overall
Mayer Gajarsa Bryson I Plager Michel Schall 'Clevenger Lourie Rader Newsrnan
72.7% 66.7% 50.0% 42.9% 412% 37.5% 37.5% 18.8% 16.70% 1180
56.3% 35.7% -53.8% 66.7% 42.90o 615% 72.7% 78.6% 30.8% 38.5%
60.0% 56.1/ 519% 56.3% 40.0% , 48.3% 57.9% 46.7% 211% 22.6%
is a prime example as shown in Figure 2. Looking at his entire
record, Judge Lourie has voted pro-brand 53.3% of the time.
However, since December 2003, he has voted pro-brand in 81.3%
of his participations. Obviously, Judge Lourie voted heavily in
favor of the generic (78.6%) prior to that time. His opinion
writing has mirrored that trend: 52.2% pro-brand overall but
75.0% pro-brand post-MMA and 72.7% pro-generic pre-MMA.
Judge Clevenger has followed a similar trend in his voting: overall
he has voted pro-generic 57.9% of the time, however, post-MMA
enactment he has voted pro-brand 62.5% of the time versus 72.7%
pro-generic pre-MMA.
Looking at the changes in voting patterns, Judge Gajarsa
showed the largest pro-generic shift (A 31.0%) since 2003,
followed by Judge Mayer (A 16.5%). Meanwhile, Judge Lourie
showed the largest pro-brand shift (A 59.8%), followed by Judges
Clevenger (A 35.2%), Newman (A 26.7%), Schall (A 24.0%),
Plager (A 23.8%), and Rader (A 8.6%). Only three judges (Lourie,
Mayer, and Gajarsa) were more than one standard deviation from
the average shift of the court. The behavior of these judges may
350
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be surprising in light of Congress' intent to improve generic
competition with the MMA. Perhaps the judges that swung
towards the brand side felt that Congress went too far in enabling
generics or that incentives for the brand companies to bring new
drugs to market would be too diminished. 1
22
V. IMPLICATIONS
A major implication of this study is that four or five of the
judges that are currently on the Federal Circuit have decided cases
with a strong viewpoint towards one side in ANDA litigations.
Judges Gajarsa and Mayer have consistently voted and written pro-
generic, especially since late 2003. On the other side, Judges
Newman and Rader have clearly and consistently voted and
written pro-brand. Judge Newman has moved further towards the
brand in the years since the MMA was enacted. In addition, Judge
Lourie's voting and writing pattern since 2003 has strongly
favored brand companies.
From this major implication, a secondary implication is
that these judges have not followed the intent Congress had in
enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act - to provide a balance between
generic competition and brand innovation. Judicial activism
becomes a concern when a judge constantly flouts the intentions of
Congress. From Judge Newman's viewpoint, "divergence [of
viewpoints] also reflects the court's 'activism,' as new facts lead it
into areas of uncertain public policy, and the court brings its own
viewpoints to bear on the jurisprudence assigned to it."' 123 She has
also "caution[ed] against a retrenchment from that elegant
simplicity [effective Federal Circuit opinions], into a policy-driven
activism whereby the application of the law will not be known
until the Federal Circuit hears the case."' 24 However, Judge
Newman's quest for simplicity is misplaced and predictability is
122. Interestingly, Judges Lourie and Newman have prior experience at
brand pharmaceutical companies both as researchers and in their IP
departments, which may explain their strong pro-brand voting and writing
patterns.
123. Paulene Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial
Activsim?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 683, 683 (1993).
124. Id.
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not the only or the primary goal of patent law jurisprudence, 125
especially where Congress has dictated a desire for balancing
competing interests. Under the United States Constitution, judges
are supposed to follow Congressional mandates and only substitute
their own judgments when the language and legislative history
from Congress is not clear. Congress was clear in its intentions in
the ANDA context. As such, Judges Newman, Rader, Lourie,
Gajarsa, and Mayer may have allowed their own preferences to
enter into their decisions in spite of the intentions of balance from
Congress. Judges Gajarsa and Mayer may be somewhat excused
for this behavior in light of the intention behind the MMA,
namely, to further allow generic competition. However, Judges
Lourie, Newman, and Rader may be acting as advocates for their
views and venturing into an area that is reserved for members of
Congress.
Another secondary implication is that the outcome of an
ANDA case may be determined by the panel that hears the case.
For example, it seems unlikely that a generic would have much of
chance to win a close case when Judges Newman, Rader, and
Lourie are on the panel. However, the paucity of panel data does
not lend this hypothesis to empirical analysis.126 As a general
matter, the Federal Circuit does not reveal the identity of the
judges assigned to a particular case until oral argument. Assuming
that the composition of panels may affect the outcome in ANDA
cases, this policy has important effects, both positive and negative.
On the negative side, keeping panel membership a secret
until oral argument dramatically decreases the chances of
settlement while an appeal is pending. By the time the parties
know of the identity of the panel, all costs of the appeal (writing
briefs, filing fees, argument preparation, etc.) have been expended,
perhaps removing the primary impetus for settlement. In contrast,
125. The Supreme Court's recent practice of striking down the Federal
Circuit's bright line rules that establish clarity and definiteness for being overly
wooden supports this idea. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 415-18 (2007) (condemning a rigid application of the TSM test in
obviousness analysis); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393-94
(2006) (striking the Federal Circuit's general rule of granting injunctions upon
finding of infringement and no invalidity).
126. Similarly, the lack of the same two-judge combinations hearing multiple
cases prevents objective analysis in this regard.
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a rule that allows parties to know panel membership months in
advance would increase both the time and the cost-incentives to
settle the appeal.127 More settlements mean lower social costs and
free the Federal Circuit to spend additional time on the more
difficult (and less predictable) cases. A policy change by the court
to release panel composition as soon as possible would be a
simple, cost-free way for the court to increase the settlement rate.
On the other hand, there are jurisprudential benefits to the
Federal Circuit's current panel secrecy policy. One important
finding of this study is that while several members of the Federal
Circuit have voted distinctly for one side in ANDA cases, about
half of the court has not. This in turn means that some panels will
be more predictable than others - for example, those with a
majority of "swing" judges or a combination of all three types
(pro-generic, pro-brand, and swing) would be harder to predict.
Given this understanding, settlement rates will likely be unequally
distributed when panel composition is known with less settlement
of panels that are relatively less predictable.1 28 This, then, has the
potential of affecting the jurisprudence, with a larger proportion of
opinions being decided by panels (and written by judges) that are
less predictable. This, obviously, could have long-term negative
effects on the overall performance of the court.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the Federal Circuit has come close to meeting the
Congressional goals embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Act based on
the nearly 50% split in binding decisions in ANDA cases.
However, a significant number of judges have voted and written
opinions in a manner that could be viewed as inconsistent with the
intentions of Congress. Judges Gajarsa and Mayer have sided with
the generics in their voting and opinions while Judges Rader and
Newman have supported the brands. Recently, Judge Lourie has
voted and written pro-brand nearly exclusively. Unfortunately,
127. Cf George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 & fig.6 (1984) (depicting how
expectations can affect the likelihood of settlement).
128. See id. at 15-16 (demonstrating the relationship between settlement rates
and predictability).
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there is insufficient data to determine the effects of these
individual judges on each other and the other judges of the Federal
Circuit when empanelled together. However, this study raises
concerns that these judges could be becoming more like advocates
and also that they could be flouting Congressional intent by
disregarding a balanced approach to ANDA jurisprudence.
Finally, any advantage in furthering settlements coming from the
predictably of these judges is lost due to the Federal Circuit's
policy of not announcing panels prior to oral argument.
Martin S. Masar III
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